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INTRODUCTION
TheTVTO ModelofKrugerandNorrisIwasdevelopedtoprovideanapproachtotheoptimization
ofa testprogrambasedonpredictionfflightperformancewithasingleflightoptioninmind,and
, onlyminimalconsiderationofreflightwasmade. Inthispaperwe extendtheprocesstomorethan
oneflightasinSpaceShuttlemissions.We utilizetheconceptof"utility"whichwas,"trst
developedunderthename of"availability"byBloomquist,2 3andfurtherdevelopedby Kruger
andNorris.Inadditiontotheconceptofutility,a modeldevelopedbyWilliamsandKruger4 is
-- usedtofollowperformancethroughthevariousoptionsthatoneencounterswhenonehasthe
reflightandretrievabilitycapabilitiesofSpaceShuttle.
....... The"LostValue"modelproposedby KrugerandNorrisismodifiedtoproduceameasureofthe
probabil/tyofamission'ssuccess,ach/evingadesiredutilityusinga minhnalcost eststrategy.The
resultingmatrixofprobabilitiesandtheirassociatedcostsprovidesameansforprojectmanagement
' toevaluatevarioustestandreflights rategies.
• Finally, recommendations for future study are provided.
THE CONCEPT OF UTILITY _
One may ask, why use a concept such as "utility" instead of a more tried and standard concept
such as "reliability". The answer lies, in part, in the mathematical theoretical development of the
: fieldofreliabilityandtheeverdevelopingcomplexityofspacepayloads(satellites,experiments
on SpaceShuttle,tc.).
• AsmentionedinGnedenko,el.al.5,"oneofthemostintriguingproblemsinreliabilitytheoryis
thedevelopmentofprinciplesofdesignofacomplexapparatusthatwillfunctionevenwhen some
ofitselementswillnot.Biologicalsystemspossessthisvaluablepropertytoahighdegree.The
studyofbiologicalsystemsfromthepointofvlewoftheprinciplesoftheirdesignandhighrel/abfl-
itywillprovidemany toolsthatwillbeusedfortechnologicalaccompl/shm_nt.We areconvinced
thatnaturehastakenacoursenotonlyalongthelinesofextravagants andbyredundancybut
primarilythroughselectionfoptimumsystemsolutions,i.e.,acarefulchoiceofelementscapable
• ofmaintain/nsanextraordinarystabilityinperformance.No doubt,studyofapeculiarfeatureof
biologicalsystemsfromthestandpointofreliabilitytheorywillenableresearcherstodiscover
principlesnotyetconceived,sincewe tendtoapproachtechnicalproblemsexclusivelyfromthe
pointofviewof"traditionaltechnology."
Asspac_raftbecomemorecomplex,theirnatureapproachesthatofa biologicalsystem.Itiswith
thisviewinmindthatutilitymodelsthebehaviorofcomplexspacecraftpayloadsbetterthan
reliability.Eventhoughutilitycanbeclassifiedasareliabilityconcept,itisnotthesameasthe
classicalonceptofreliability.Classically,reliabilityis houghtofastheprobabilityoffailure-fret
operationofa unit,components:orsystemduringsometimet.Utilityisa measureoftheoverall
usefulnessofaspacecraftorapayloadandisthoughtofasthesuccessfulnessofamissionas
comparedtoaperfectmission,Thusitallowsformultiplefailurestooccurduringtheflight.
Utility doesnotdealwiththeprobabilityofthefailurefreeoper;:.ionofasystem.A_asequence
offailuresoccur,thesecausepayloadstoperformtoalesserdevjeethanperfection.Thisisvery
similartohow abiologicalsystemperforms.As failuresoragingoccurs,biologicalsystemstill
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ifunction, but to a lesser degree than before. With this in mind, it seems like the transitional step to
the study Of biological system is to study spacecraft operation. Although the previous statement is
somewhat contrary to Gnedenko's quote, we believe the line of discovery is from simple systems
to complex systems.
In spacecraft operation or payload performance, each anomaly can be classified as to its seriousness
or the amount of degradation that it causes to the particular mission. Utility can then be calculated
from the observed occurrence of a random sequence of anomalies or types of failures by assigning
a certain criticality to each of the failures in the sequence and then considering utility of the pay-
load or spacecraft after the occurrence of any failure as the product of one minus the criticality
term at the particular failure multiplied by the previous remaining utility.
The instantaneous utility U, is defined as follows:
u =i'rz(1-Vi)ni (1)
where Di denotes the criticality of a type i failure, _2 is an index set for the various criticalities of i
failures that occur during space flight, and n i is the total number of failul es for any particular
type of criticality during any space flight. 'i
The average utility, U, is defined in Kruger and Norris as
uo-ft
where t is the duration of the mission. It should be noted that this definition is a slight modifica-
tion of the definition of utility given by Williams 6 ; this modification arises in the discussion of the
calculation of criticality. For a complete discussion of the concept of the criticality of failures and
their classification, see Bloomquist 2,3, Timmins7, and Williams 6.
To extend equation (1) to multiple flights, one must consider various options such as repair and
refurbishment; repair, refurbishment, and retest; and repair or refurbishment. These various optiom
and their effect on the calculation of utility will generally fall into one of three decision-making
options. If one repairs perfectly, then the initial (or instantaneous) utility in that particular flight
reverts back to the maximum value of 1.0. If one does not repair or retest, then the initial instan-
taneous utility of the subsequent mission is related to the instantaneous utility at the end of the
last mission. If there is testing in the intermediate stage, then the average utility of the proceeding
mission is influenced by this amount of testing, and the average utility of the mission i_ changed
accordingly. The mathematics of these options and their effect on utility during multiple flights
will be discm_d in the section on Failur_ Flow Process,
Calculation Of Utility For Multiple Flights i
a
To calculate utility for multiple flights, we have a rmitc sequence of ut'flities, {Ut}t-. 1, which
corresponds to some particular managerial decision-making process. For example, 131 would be
2
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the average utility obtained after subjecting me spacecraft to the thermal-vacuum test environment
at the component and syscem levels. The utility thus obtained is a result of some testing; the more
• one tests, the more utility one obtains up to a fixed point less than 1.0.
Depending upon some desired average utility, Ud, one either reflys a spacecraft without repair, or
repairs and then reflys, etc., thus exercising a managerial option. If, for instance, one selects the
felly option, then a second average utility, U2, is obtained. As this decision process continues, one
obtains a sequence of utilities. The argument for the calculation of 0 as affected by multiple flight
utility can be generalized even though it is speculated that most experiments will only experience
, one or two flights beyond the original flight.
Since utility can be thought of as the amount of information collected as compared to the amount
of information that can be collected were there no anomalies, it is a class property. By this we
mean that it is a measurement of the overall utility of all of the components. As before, utility is
_ an integral over time where the number of failuresover that time interval is represented by a func-
• tional failure mode form. If we want to calculate average utility, then we divide the integral of
the instantaneous utility by the length of time interval. We thus have
1 ftf= -- (1 - D*)F(t) dt (3)
" tf o
where tf is the final time, D* is the particular average measure of criticality of a failure, and F(t)
is the cumulative failure function.
If we consider continuous failure modes over several flight and reflight options, then we may con-
sider the case of repair and non.repair options. To help visualize this scheme, we let t I be the
total time in flight one, .t2 be the total time in flight two, and t3 be the total time in flight three.
If there were no repair before flight two, then the average utility for flight two, is
U2 I f (h+t2)= -- (1 - D*) F(t) dt (4)
e
t I
If there were repai: before flight two, then
1 f t202 " t2-" o (I - D*)FR(t) (S)
- where Fg(O is theeumulative failure function when repairs are made. If there were no repairs
after flights one and two, then the average utility over flight three would be
• I f (tl+t2+t3)0 3 = (I - D_')F(t) at (6)
tT (tl Ä 2)
O0000001-TSAO8
and if there was repair after flight two,
I f t3U3 _-3o" (l-D*)FR(t)dt (71
The exact failure modes F(t) and FR(t) will be calculated as m the Failure Flow Process section.
We can see that the effect on the limits of integration of a repair is to start the time clock at the
beginning or to integrate from zero to a final time.
Certainty of Obtaining a Specified Q
One of the basic assumptions made in the TVTO model of Kruger and Norris is that a certain aver-
age utilRy (termed availability in that report) results from a series of tests. If a project manager
specifies a certain desired level of utility, then a decision-making process that involves cost and
uncertainty would be necessary.
Uncertainty means some inability to predict accurately. In the case of testing, this means that we
are not I00 percent certain that we will obtain the utility that we specified. Therefore it is neces- ',,
gary to calculate the risk involved in obtaining a specified average utility.
Once the manager has specified the degree of certainty desired, the objective of a cost strategy is
to obtain the maximum performance for the minimum cost. Following this Lineof reasoning, we
establish minimum cost curves for a given utility. These minimum cost curves are unique to the
particular project and have to be derived under specific conditions.
Wenow turn to the derivation of the probability of obtaining a given U. As mentioned in
Williams6, [_ is a function of D* (some average measure of criticality) and ni (some number of
failures over a _pecified time). For any particular flight, the time period is specified. For example,
various missions were investigated in Kruger and Norris.
It is important to note that nl is represented by a function of the form
Fo(t) = Act B°
and that D* is replaced by some constant value as given in Williams6. This value is, for a speci-
fied 90 percent certainty, the upper confidence limit for D* which we denote by D_ . Once D*
is replaced by D_ at a particular confidence level, L" then becomes a function of the failures in
any particular flight.
To specify the probability calculation of U or the risk of 0 _ Ud, where Ud is given, we must
answer the basic question, "Does a given Ud give or specify a unique failure mode function
Fo(t)"? Looking at printouts from the various options in the calculation of utility versus total
number of failures, the answer appears to be aff'u'mative. To formalize the above idea, we state the
following:
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Theorem (I.0). A given Ud specifies or gives a unique failure mode function Fo(t).
Proof: Recall that
= 1 ftf )AotBo-- ( 1 - D_ dt (8)tf o
In the above equation, tf, D_, and Bo are all given. Bo is given with the assumption that it is
process dependent. This assumption will be elaborated upon in the section on Failure Flow Process.
Assumethat0 isgiven.Thisimplies
A Bo A(KtBO)Ao
C= Jo (K)A°t = fo dt (9)
whereC = U. tf,A = if,andK = I- D_. i
ILettingx = Ao andusingthesesubstitutions,we have "_
AP
F(x)= J f(t)x dt (10)
0
where
Bo
f(t)= Kt .
Using difference quotients and applying the limit, we have
= limit [A f(t)(x x`¼dtF'(x)
h-,O Jo .... h ......
F'(x_= fx(t) ....... = ( )
"o
L
Since 0 < f(t) < I, then F'(x) <0; this impli_ that U is decreasing continuously over time.
Since Q or F(x) is decreasing over time, this implies that if x! _ x2, then F(x! ) _ F(x2). This
being the case, there are no two different Ao's which give rise to the same F(x). This in turn
:S implies that Fo(t ) = AotB° is specified for a given U.
The importance of Theorem 1.0 is that it enables one to make probabilistic or risk statements about
.. O from the ptobabilisti¢ structure of the Product Limit estimation procedure for l_(t) found in
O0000001-TSAIO
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=_s' WilliamsandKruger4. Beforewe developamethodforcalculatingtheprobabilityofobtaininga
specified0 we giveabriefreviewoftheproductlimitestimationprocedurefoundinWilliams
and Kruger.
i The ProductLimitestimateofthedistributionoffailuresduringthecomponentandsystemlevel
testsandtheorbitalf ightofapayloadmeasurestheperformanceofaspacecraftintermsofits
• abilityosurviveinthatparticularmode ofoperation.As inreference(4)we make thefollowing
designations:
p
(I)_(t)w the ofnit
number failures
(2)f:*(t)ffinl/N_ F(t)/Nwhere N isthenumberofcomponentsinthepayload
(3) t)----I F*(t).
The nextquestionwe exploreishow toascertaintheprobabilityofobtainingacertainutility.
Suppose from Theorem 1.0, we have a unique failure mode function which may be obtained from t
the failure flow process. Thus, U = C, which corresponds to F(t) = n or to F'f t) = n/N or to
P(t) -- (N - n)/N.
Ifwe now calculateprobabilitybasedontheabovestatements,we havenotexpressedthevariabil-
ityofthesystemandareoperatingata50 percentrisklevel.Anotherway tovisualizethisisthat
I$" ^
_ we areoperatingon thecurvethatdescribescumulativefailures,F*(t),withoutanyvariability,or
we are estimating with point estimates. To deal with this situation, we have one of two alterna-
tives:
!
i
I)we testandacceptlessutilityatagivenlevelofcertainty I
° it_: or
= 2) we test more to achieve a higher level of utility at the given level of certainty.
=_ Note, a test-fix process is assumed.
In order to develop a scheme to accomplish either of these two above objectives and to observe the
variabilityof U, we refertoWilliamsandKrugerandderivetheappropriateprobabilitystate-
g ments. An example will help visualize the approaches.
EXAMPLE I
" Suppose 0 = 0.40 corresponds to or is equivalent to F(t) = 15. This implies that F*(t) = 15/16,
' whereN = 60 ;thisinturnimpliesthatP(t)" 45/60.
Usingequation(12),reference(4),we findthat
F*(t)- I+ (F*(t)-I)[I± Za/2 ] (12)
1
i
6
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orequivalently:
F*(t) = F'(t) ± (F'(t)- 1) (Z_/2 ) V_(t) (13)
Suppose that x/_ = 1/32 for sake of this example. Inserting the appropriate values into the
above equation at the 95 percent confidence level, we have
F'(t)= F"(t)± (_---5> (1.96)(3-_-)
= (IS.5)60--. .045=0.25 ± 0.045 = [0.205, 0.295]
t:(t) = 60 [0.205, 0.295] = [12.3, 17.7]
This means that we are 95 percent confident that we do not have a,_y more than 17.7 failures. This
also translates into a statement about utility. If we want a 95 percent bound on utility, we 1_;'.- to
relate 17.7 failures to utility. This may be don© by solving for Ao in the gtneral failure process
model in the orbital case or by searching for the appropriate number of corresponding failures for
a given utRRy on the failure flow process program. After this is done, we see that the corresponding
utility is less that, the utility we achieved.
EXAMPLE II
The other approach is to specify a desired ut_ity, and then test-fix beyond that level to obtain the
desired utility at the degree of confidence that the project manager specifies. This may be iUus-
trated as follows: Suppose 0(1 = 0.40 and one tests beyond this level to obtain some utility say
D2 - 0.50.
A_ in the previous example, we obtain a confidence interval for the number of failures that
correspond to the particular bounds on Q, say (6, 12), with the intelval cente_'ed at 9. Now
suppose that U ,, 0.40 corresponds to 11 failures. To find PKU < 0.40 [ Ua = 0.50), the probabil-
ity that 0 falls below 0.40 given that one has achieved a utility of 0.50, one has to calculate
Pr(F(t) _ 11 IF(t) = 9). This is a measure of the risk of not obtaining D = 0.40, given that one
has obtain_ U = 0.50 through a prior testing program. Thus, the probabgity of obtaining at least
0 = 0.40 is Pr(F(t) _; I 1 IF(t) = 9).
-_,
To formalize the exam.pies in terms of U's, we consid©r©quation (13). Let this confidence interval
correspond to_,say_ Ua = C1 . To make..a_cobability statement _bout Od = C2 given that C'a
=C 1 where Ud < Ua, we have to relate Ua = C1 to a given number of failures and then to
F_(t) ,_ n I t'N by dividing the number of failures by the number of components. Once this has
been done, we must relate 0 d = C2 to F,_(g)= n2/N.
1
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• After these relatiomlups are made, then
o
: Pr(lJd _ C2 {0m " Cl)" Pr(Fd(t)_ n2/N{F:(,)- nl/I"4)
We have a pseudo-normality situation; that is, a situation where one can make probability state-
ments about a given variable through the normality of another related variable. For purposes of
discussion and diagramatic arguments, we visualize this symbolically as
0a " n (Ud,O(Ua)) (15)
Zp.s.n.,*(Ua- Od)/(o(Ua)) (16) 11
l
where Zp.s.a. stands for the pseudo-normal random variable and is calculated by the formal _ven
• by equation (I 6). F_(t) is calculated from the Product Limit estimation procedure as described
haWilUamsand Kruger. As seen by equation (14), it is necessary to calculate or estimate the
variance V(t). To do this, we make use of a random number generator and u_e a Monte Carlo
, technique wluch we describe in the following section.
Monte Carlo Estimation of _'(t)
Using methods found in Kruger and Norris, we may determine the unique number of failures for
S ^ _0i a given utility. This gives one Fo(t) At . To illustrate how we u_ this model to place failures
ha time, we consider the following example.
Suppose that a given U corresponds to the situation where one has five failures over a specified
orbital time. One has then to place these failures in time over the time interval for the orbital
case. Essentially, we equate
^ I/Bo
-,A(tl O)=nl _ tl =
. I/B o
Thus, we have produced a sequence of times which we can use in the Product Limit estimation
process to calculate V(t) (see equation (lO) in Williams and Kruger),
8
I±.,: ....................... " '
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The above method illustrates what we do in the Monte Carlo estimation procedure. In the:case
.......... where we have five failures, we use a uniform random number generator and obtain five numbers
on the interval (0, l). Suppose that we obtained, after ordering, the sequence, (0.2.0.34, 0.52,
0.6, 0.82). We next multiply these numbers by 15reand obtain {I, 1.7, 2.6.3, 4. I ). Letting
i n I = 1, n2 = 1.7, n3 = 2.6, n4 - 3, and n5 - 4.1, we calculate t I ..... t5 with the above formula for
- nl, ...,ns,§o,andk.
After obtaining the failure times, we use the _oduct Limit estimation procedure to define the
parameters necessary to calculat_ _'l el). We rep¢_ the process and calc_!a_t¢ V2(t), After n steps,
11
V(t) = Vi(tl (I 7)
__ i= I '
r By the central limit theorem and Monte Carlo techniques, _:(t) converges to V(t). Since the
generalization of this example is apparent, we do not describe it here.
To conclude this section, we may note that the mathematical procedures for the option "we t.-'s,
andacceptlessutilityatagivenlevelofcertainty"isverysimilartothederivationdescribedabcve
and will be omitted. '_
APPROACH TO CHOOSING A COST
To adapt the preceding discussion of utility to a cost model, it is beneficial to e_an.ine the environ-
ment of the project manager. Increasingly, budget consideration will constrain t,,sting and
refttrbish/rdlight decisions. Furthermore, there very likely will be competition among a variety of
projectsfortheselimitedresources( eeSaylcsandChandler8).Theallocationofresources-
dollars,equipmentorpersonnel- among theavailablealternativeswillbeagrowingproblemfor
themanager.
The Fiscalconstraintsplaya largeroleinprojectmanagement(seeLloydandLipowg).To date,
most spacecraft test cost optimization models have relied on expected value concepts, e.g.
=' CampbellIO,DonelsonII,andNaegele andSeRinscheggl2.Whileincorporatingtherangeof
possiblecosts,thesingleexpectedvalue- whichinsomemodelsissupplementedwithameasure
ofvariability- may notbeofgreathelptoamanagerfacingbudgetlimitations.Attimesthe
optimalteststrategymay notfitintotheavailablebudget,orotherneedsarecompetingforfunds
makinganon-optimalsolutionnecessary.Thesuggestedformatofthemodifiedcostmodelclearly
displaysthemarginalchangesinperformancewhichmay bcpurchased_oradditionaltestdollars.
The formatprovidesprobabilitiesofsuccessforvariouslevelsofinvestmentintesting.
Given the few repetitions of an experiment available to most project managers and their need to
icnow close-to-actual cost, we have modified the expected value model in this report. While con.
tinuing to rely on the probabilisti¢ mathcmlitical approach of expected value, the output of the
modifiedcostmodelprovidesprobabilitiesofsuccesstbrvariouslevelsofcosts.The modelcom-
putestheleastcost estandrefurbish/reflightstra egythatwillattaina particularprobabilityof
achieviag desired utility. An example of an output matrix for a specified, desired utility is shown
in Table I.
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Table I
Probability of Achieving U = 0.53 Versus Least Cost Strategy
Probability of achieving Cost of least cost
0 " 0..53 _ strategy
60% 50,000
70% 65,000
75% 73,000
80% 85,000
85% 97,000
9O,,0 112,000
95% 153,000
Referring to Table I, the project manager or research team has determined that a utility of 0.53
will provide sufficient data for mission success (for a discussion of determining 0 d from past
spacecraft performance, see Williams and Kruger't). The least cost strategies for obtaining the
probabilities itt the left column for the particular spacecraft's characteristics - complexity of
design, weight, volume, refurbishment costs, fli#t parameters, and extra STS services - are cal-
culated and _iatedin the right column. With this information the project manager is able to see:
1. how much a certain probability of success will cost,
2. the highest degree of certainty affordable within the project budget, and
3. how additional investments of specified dollar amounts will enchance the probability
of success, or, conversely, how specific dollar amounts debited will reduce the
probability of success. 1A furtherbenefitoftheinformationformatofTable1isthatamanagermay make costcomparisons
between experiments on a given program. If a program has a number of experiments competing for
resources, the format presents information that can be used for allocating funds among them. For
instance, a manager may decide to reduce test expenditures on one experiment, thereby accepting
a slightly lower probability of success; the funds freed by this reduction in spending may then be
t
applied to another experiment enhancing its likelihood of success. !
Certainty of Achieving a Desired Average Utility
Thedesignofthemodifiedcostmodelrelieson theassumptionofanearnormaldistributionof
'ttility and on a distinction between Ud, desired averageutility, and Ua, achievahie average utility.
As the utility concept has emerged, it has become common to speak of Ua as if there was a 50,o
probability of actually attaining that level of utility or one higher. Through testing, the Ua level
couk _be increased to a higher utility, Igain with a 50%probability of that utility or a higher one
being reached. Given the roughly normal character of the distributions of utility, this means that
10
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0 Wis the center or mean value of such a distribution. It also _:_ggeststhat through more testing
the entire distribution shifts to center on a new Ua value. Figure 1 illustrates this idea.
_| Utility U| U| Utility
(2a) (2b)
... _,
Figure 1
The Effect of Testing on Utility
After Testing, U_'> U_
In figure 2a, there is a 50% probability of attaining Ua'. After testing and repairs, there is a 50%
probability of attaining 0_' or higher, where 0_ < O_r I
Rather than speaking of attaining the new post-test utility with a probability of 50%, it is possible '_
to think of attaining the original utility, On, or higher with a probability greater than 50%. The
post-test probability of attaining at least _ is shown in figure 2 as the crosshatched area. Note
_tF
that this area is based on the distribution centered at U_, the post-test utility with 50% probabil-
Ry of being achieved.
a Ui Utility
Figure 2 i
Post-Test Probability of Attaining at Least U'
If a desired average utility, Ud, is specified as necessary for a mission's success, then through testing
it is possible to increase the probability that 0 a > Od. With testing or payload performance
imp_rovementwe have increases in I2a at 50% probability, or, correspondingly, increase in
Pr(Ua > D-d) for reflight missions. As the test program progrosses, the utility distribution curve
drifts with means 04 < 01_'< 0_" < .... Each step signifies improved utility or payload per-
formance through more thorough testing and correction of identified failures,
Assume that testing has brought a payload to the point where Pr(U.tt)= S or 0 a = Ud • With :
further testing and corrections, there wiU be increases in LIa . As Ua and Erd diverge, the
accompanying increases in Pr(Oa > 0 d) may be estimated as follows:
lII
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iii,
Given: Oa > Ud , Pr(Ua _ Ud) = 0.50 + Pr(Z L < Z < 0) where Pr(Z L < Z < 0) is the probability
associated with the Z-score of:
Od-O
,- ZL -
a_ a
.| where Ud results from the number of failures that give rise to the desired utility, Ul results from
Ill. the number of failures that give rise to the average achieved utility, and OUa is the standard devia-
_ tion of :he number of failures that give rise to Ua. (Note: see section on Certainty of Obtaining
a Specified U.)
As testing proceeds uniformly and _a increases beyond Ud and approaches Umax, the incre-
D mental improvements in Ua get smaller. These decreasing incremental gains are due to:
IP -
: 1. the existence of a Umar. term for various flights and
2. the fact that one has to test longer at both the component and system level to
:" detect failures as testing progresses through time.
Since the cost of testing is a function of time, and the time increments necessary to detect failures
increase as Ua increases, the test cost increases as we try to improve _a • To help visualize these
concepts, we consider figure 3.
U| Umlm
A2 f-_,: i
!
- S_ S2 $3 Tat _Wii_m
Resources
Figure 3
The Effect upon Test Program Resources of Incremental Changes in Ua
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From figure 3 we see that additional investments, SI, $2, and S3, in testing to increase Ua produce
decreasing gains in t]a, :'I. :'2, and :'3. Eventually these gains approach an asymptote where
Oi = Umax and set an upper bound to the improvement in I_ that is possible through testing.
The concept of Umax arises from the fact that there are those failures for which this test is 1
inapplicable,andtherefore,evenifthistestwereperfect,acerta/nnumberoffailuresremainand Igiverisetoanaverageutilityoflessthan1.0,
,i
' Increasesin Ua arepurchasedthroughtestingandcorrections.Therefore,we may a_ume arela-
tionshipbetweenUa andcost.Assumingauniformlyincreasingfunctionwithtime,wherecost
istheordinateandaverageutility,Ua,istheabcissa,we may visualizetheminimalcostcurveasin
figure 4. 1
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Figure4
HypotheticalMinimum CostCurve
We takethecostcurveinfigure4 astheminimumcostcurveforattainingthevariousaverage
utilities.$'istheminimum costteststrategytoachieveUa= Ud. The minunum costcurveis
derived empirically from the TVTO computer model output. The output provides mixes of com-
ponent and system level tests and the cost and improvement in Ua for each mix. The model takes
into account payload complexity when making cost estimates.
Extendingthe ModeltoMultipleFlights
To thispoint,thecostmodelhasincludedonlyground-basedtesting- mixesofcomponentand
systemsleveltesting- andasingleflight.WiththeadventoftheSpaceShuttle,reflightbecomes
aviablealternative.Therearethreesituationsit,whichtherefurbish/reflystrategymustbe
considered:
I. ifthedesiredUd isgreaterthanUrn=x,
2. ifthecostofobtainingUd viagroundbasedtestingisbeyondtheproject'sbudget
limit,and
13
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3. if the cost of attaining 0 d with ground base testing alone is greater than the cost of
refurbishing and reflying the payload.
Examining these situations separately will help to disclose some of the features of the refurbish/
refly option.
In the tint situation, when Ud > Uma_, unlimited resources devoted to testing will not yield
the necessary probability of achieving U d . In large part this is due to modes of failure unrelated
to the test program.
After the first flight and succeeding Rights, these modes of failure may be detected and corrected.
Identifying and correcting flight failures will increase the payload's performance capability upon
reflight.
-_ It is untikely that payloads will be flown solely for engineering p_rformance information. Rather,
they will perform their data collection or transmission duties as well as have their engineering
performance monitored. The collection of data on the fh'st flight may reduce the data collection
needs of the second flight. The second flight may have less stringent performance requirements
andyetresultinan overallsuccessfulmission.The U_ perflighttherefore,may bereduced
througha flight/refurbish/reflystrategy.A reduced_d on thef'trstflightwillmake iteasier
(possible) to attain a given Ud on the second flight. 'it
The second situation is the case of budget limitation preventing the desired Ud from being
reached. If the refurbi_/refly option lies within the budget limits, it should be examined.
This case could exist when the payload has low launch and refurbish cost (low volume and
weight and easily reproducible pacts) but high test costs (many components or systems
requiring individual testing). As in the t'h-st situation, the combination of a more thorough
"test" situation and the partial collection of data may provide an increase to the necessary
In the first case it was suggested t_hatthe refurbish/rcfly strategy, by providing the "u_timate
test" situation, may increase the Umax available by reducing the number of non-thermal-
vacuum related failures that a payloa_l will encounter. Estimates from a model have the
potential to now how much ground-basec' testing simulates the acl:ual conditlons of space
flight (in terms of the number of failures detected). The refurbish/refly strategy, by using
the space environment, reduces the area of uncertainty; the potential for successful performance
is thereby increased. Figure 5 Rlustrates this increase in Ureax tt_,',ugh by the use of a
second flight option.
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The Effect of Refurbishment and Reflight
Curve A in figure 5 depicts the improvements in average utility derived solely from ground-based
testing. It is a testing, not a testing and reflight, strategy.
Curve B repr.esentsthe cost curve for a test strategy that combines ground-based testing with
refurbish/reflight. As curve B rises, the additional costs are for increases in refurbishment and
ground-based testing. CurveB represents the costs to refurbish and refly a spacecraft once plus
various levels of ground-based testing. As ground.based testing is increased, the costs increase, as
does the attainable averageutility. Strategy B provides more opportunities to detect failures than
strategy A, thereby increasing Ureax , the maximum averageutility achievable for a particular
option,
The relation of curve A to ct,,rveB will be determined largely by payload size and complexity.
Launch costs are a functior; of payload volume and weight, the orbit inclination, and the flight
services requ;,-ed. Refurbishment costs appearto depend upon the complexity and sensitivity of
the payload. Another cost v.hich may be significant is the cost of delaying the project through a
second flight cycle. If a group must be held in reserve while the refurbish/re fly cycle is going on,
these costs could be considerable. Since such delay costs are highly possible, they are dealt with in
our general model.
There may be some concern that the cost curve for strategy B, the single reflight strategy, includes
only the cost of one launch although the payload is actually flown twice. Since all missions include
at least one flight, the expense of one launch is considered common to all missions and is not a
part of the test costs. Flight costs arc il_orcd as a portion of the test costs until the test strategy
callsforadditionalf illhts;thenthesereflightcostsareincludedastestcosts.The inclusionfthe
reflight coastsallows comparison of the varicus ret'lightand ground:ba_ed testi_ngcombinations to
15
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find the lowest cost strategy for obtaining a desired probability of success. Notice that in Curve A
no flight costs whatsoever are included, though the vehicle will certainly be flown.
An important cost concern is the timing of the flights in the two strategies. STS costs are increased
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) cost escalator 14. The timing of flights will affect costs due
to this inflation factor. Figure 6 depicts a time line of possible series of events for strategies A and
B, just testing or testing and reflying.
StrategyA Flight
0 FT"t _7
- = Timt
Strategy 8 L Test --_ Refurbish
Flight 1 Flight 2
, Figure 6
A Comparison of Strategies A and B
Inthecaseshown,strategyA usesextensiveground-basedtestingandasingleflight.StrategyB
usessomeground-basedtestingandtwo flights.The f'wstflightinB occursbeforetheflightinA.
Iftheflightsincludeidenticalservicesandthepayloadweightandvolumeisnotdifferent,then
flightlorB willbelessexpensivethantheflightinA. The flightinA willbelessexpensivethan
theflight2_ B. An earlierflightwillbelesscostly(assuminginflation)thana laterone.The
savings accruing to earlier flights may be estimated as
Savings = L(1 + E)/A - L(I + E)IB (18)
Where L = present flight costs
E = monthlycost escalator
JA= numberofmonthsuntilflightinA
IB = numberofmonthsuntilflightinB
L(I-.E)Igivesthecostofa RightJ monthsfortodayassumingaconstantrateofinflationE.
Usingthisequation,thecostsforallfutureflightsmay becomputedandthetotalsavings(orloss)
ofeachstrategycalculated.
Inflationisonlyoneway thatcostsmay fluctuate.Theremay bepricingincreasesindependentof
inflation.Suchincreasesoccurwhen itbecomesapparenthat hepricechargedforaservicedoes
notfullycoverthecostofprovidingtheservice.Increasesmay alsobepasPthroughs.Forinstance,
fuelpricesmay riseata rategreaterthantheinflationrate.The proportionfincreasenot
reflected in the BLS escalator must be passed t_ough as a price of service increase. Since such
increases are difficult to foresee, the costs incorporated in the model will have to be updated
regularly.
Estimating refurbishment costs is difficult. The research done to date provides only rough estimates
with which to model 13. The cost estimates for refurbishment of LANDSAT vary from 30% to 75%
> of the original instrument costs 14. The variations in costs appear to depend on the complexity of
• the instrument, the disassembly time, and whether parts are standardized. A re-examination of the
LANDSAT-refurbishment raw data might reveal a functional relationship between complexity and
refurbishmentcost3.
Returningtofigure5,curvesA andB areassumedtobeminimum testcostcurveswhichincorpor-
atetheproperflightcosts,escalators,andrefurbishmentcosts.Figure5 may bemodifiedfurther
byaddingacurveC whichdepictsastrategyfortwo reflightswithrefurbishmentaswellassome
ground-basedtesting.
Figure 7 illustrates the three strategies; A, B, and C. 1
I I e/
I I
, 7,/I
I
UmaxA Umax8 UmaxC
: AverageIJtiliW
- Figure 7
A Comparison of Three Strategies
Notice that Umax ¢ is greater than either Umax a or Umax b.
• CurveC begins at a cost equivalent to the cost of ground-based testing and two refurbish/refly
cycles. Strategy C, it should be m_ntioned, assumes three flights total.
Strategies B and C may provide lower costs methods for obtaining a given 0 d . For some Ud
values, refiight strategies such as B and C may be the only method available. This is particularly
likely as the desired 12d approaches Urnax. As the costs increase rapidly for additional per-
formance certa_ty, it may become more economical to switch to a new strategy. Similarly, as
the dcsLr©dPr(Ud) approaches the maximum available through strategy B, it may be less costly
to use strategy C.
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The model may be extended by adding stratei0es using increasing numbers of flights. Such exten-
sion, however, yields smaller and smaller increases in the maximum average utility, that is, the gains
per dollar of shiftinLto "hi_her" strategies decrease. Figure 8 portrays the model extension and the
convergence of the Umax levels for many strategies.
/
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UrnaxA UmaxB Um=xi
AverageUtility
Figure 8
The Convergence of Attainable
Average Utility Towards a Maximum
The decreasing nature of the g_in in _max values results in a limit which is the ultimate Urnax
attainable after many flights. This value, max(Urn ax), is assumed to be less than 1.0. That the most
certain probability of attaining successis lessthan 1.0 reflects the possibility of a random failure
occurring at any time. Max (Umax i) may be encountered in Space Transportation System by the
Orbiter itself, its payload bay mechanisms, etc. after severalyears of operation. This value might
also be approached by payloads that are flown repeatedly.
Given a payload, its volume, weight, flight needs, complexity, and the utility desired to have the
mission perform successfully, a unique set of minimum test cost curves can be produced. These
curves will relate gains in the average utility from ground-based testing as well as through refurbish-
ment/reflight strategies. From the lowest cost frontier of the curve set, the scallop shaped line of
figure 9, cost and levels of average utility may be matched. The output format with which this
section began may thereby be derived.
The merits of using a "Lost Value" model as opposed to th,, "Utility vs. Cost" approach should be
discussed for two different kinds of payloads.
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Variation of Cost with Strategy
If one launches a communications satellite in which the transmission of data can be measured as
having value in terms of cost of data obtained and there is a one-time flight situation, then the
"Lost Value" model or approach developed in Kruger-NorrisI is adaptable as well as the approach
developed in this section. The difference in the two approaches is that the Krugerand Norris
Lost Value function takes the decision out of the projects manager's hands. It chooses the optimal
test procedure for the manager.
If one launches scientific payloads where data has a tremendous value and there is a one-time flight,
then the above comments are applicable to this type of payload.
On the other hand, if one has reflight capabilities for communication satellites or scientific payloads
where data is highly valued, then the approach where one considers "cost vs. utility" applies. This
approach aLsoapplies to the situation where one has scientific payloads where the value of the
data obtained is not tremendous or unknown regardless of whether one reflys the payload or not.
To conclude this section, we remark that the mathematical procedures for the option, "we test
to where we are and accept less utility at a siren level of certainty" is very similar to the derivation
- described above and will be omitted.
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ITHE FAILURE FLOW PROCESS
Inordertodevelopanapproachthatwouldextendtomultipleflights,we usethelogicassuggested
inKrugerandNorrisI. A fewsflnpliflcationsweremadeinthegeneralmodel,andbeforediscussing
thenew approach,we discussthebasisforsimplifyingthemodel.
Rationale for Simplifying the Kruger and Norris TVTO Model
Wenow turn to the derivation of failure flow analysis and the modifications to utility under various
decision criterion. The model developed by Krugerand Norris describes failure occurrences during
the thermal-vacuum test procedure (accounting for effects of temperature cycling and temperature
on the overall distribution of failures and normalized for the number of components) as
FT.-Tc]ZI__--=_+KN (EH + EC) I_') -t)B (19) 1
To determine the various constants in equation (19), data from 109 component level tests were
normalized, and iteration and fitting procedures vere used to determine the parameters. The pro-
gramthat normalizedthe data andgivethe fitting proceduresaregivenin reference(1).
... A method of estimation of reliability growth was developed by WiLliamsand Kruger4 using the
Product Limit estimation procedure of Kaplan and Meier19 This method has the statistical
property of consistency. This property is a convergence property; by using the Product Limit
estimation procedure, one has a theoretical, statistical representation of the distribution that
describes the frequency of failures over time allowing for the adjustments, such as components
entering and leaving the flow of tests, that were made to the data in the Kruger and Norris study.
Whenone chooses six-hour increments and estimates the growth parameter ]8,using the Product t
Limit estimation procedure, one obtains B = 0.478, and _, = 0.017 for the model F(t) = XtB.
When one uses the normalized data from Kruger and Norris and does a fit to the above model,
one obtains B = 0.485, and _,= 0.018. The multiple correlation coefficient for this data is
R2 = 0.978, which means that the model accounts for 97.8% of the variation in the system. From
this result, one concludes that the normalization process in Kruger and Norris and a simple curve
fit yield the same results for the estimation of B as the Product Limit estimates. In this sense,
one may conclude that the normalization process for F/N found in Krugerand Norris yields the
same estimates for B and ?, as the process for Product Limit estimation or vice versa.
TEe Test Process
An approach to conceptualizing how failures are uncovered may be seen in Heuser15 where failures
- arevisualizedasbeingdetectedor escapingtests. In this sameway, it is helpful to look at and
examine various assumptions and procedures that influence the flow of failures in thermal-vacuum
tests.
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The objectiveof any test program,whetherit be environmentalor reliability test screening,is to
discoverandeliminate failuresthat wouldoccurin operationaluse. To accomplishthis goal,one
tries to conceiveall possibleenvironmentsto which the product wouldbesubjectedand then to
createteststhat simulate theseoperationalenvironments. Decisionsare alsomadeasto some
optimized test proceduresin termsof cost, the quality of performance,the risk involved,the
; priority o; the spacec_raft,etc.
Thesekindsof decisionsaremadefor thermal-vacuumtestsrecognizingthat therehavebeenpre-
vioustestsat the partslevelandseveralother levels(seeHeuserl 5). Assumingthe tcstin_ p_ocedurc
haspassedthrougha sequentialstagelike Heuser'sdescription of Failure Flow Analysis, one
encountersquestionssuchashow much testingandwhat combinationof testing needsto bedone
at the thermal.vacuumteststage.
To help guidethesedecisions,one needsto know the relationshipsbetweenthe varioustest stages.
Weassume,asin Kruger and NorrisI , that the procedurecan be viewedassequentialin nature; that
is, failures"flow" (i.e., if not uncoveredproceed)from the component level tests to the systems
level tests and on to the orbital flight. Further, the Kruger and Norris model assumes that by
increasing test duration, one increases the likelihood of uncovering an incipient failure. With these
assumptions, one would like to know how long to test at the component level to eliminate a
reasonable amount of those failures which can be uncovered at that particular stage of testing.
This decision must be based on cost and time considerations and on the future quality or perform-
_mceof the spacecraft. To establish the cost-quality relationskips in the thermal-vacuum area, it is
necessary to model the failure mode, the cost mode, and the quality as testing takes place in this
environment. It should be noted that quality encompasses the concept of utility.
We beginby discussingfailure modes. To envisionthe processweconsiderthediagramof flip-re 10.
Figure I0
The Flow c ' Equipment
From previous testing and quality control of parts, we have screened out a certain number of
failures (its appropriate references, we mention Heuser15 and &. Krausz16).
If one has a procedure where failures are repaired when they occur, then it is conceivable (dis-
regarding wearout modes and random failures) that by testing over a large enough time interval,
one could eliminate those component failures that occur and are detectable during thermal-vacuum
component level testing. One, however, has to consider the amount of testing in the light of cost
and time constraints and in terms of the reliability or, in this paper, utility requirements. Since
one cannot achieve perfect utility, then one must specify some level of utility that is necessary to
meet the desired performance goal of the finished product.
It is in this frameworkof cost-benefitanalysisthat modelsplay anessentialrole.
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The Role of Models
Referring to Oxenfeldt ! 7 ;a model is a simplified replication of reality that identifies its main com-
ponents and indicates how they are interrelated. The following are some of the key elements of a
model:
: 1. It is a simplified version of a mor_ complex reality; the desree simplification varies
according to the use for which it is intended.
2. Its purpose is to illuminate a real-life phenomenon; some simplification is required
for eue and clarity of understanding.
3, Although simplified, the view of reality presented by a model does include its main
• elementsand their interrelationships;simplification occursby omitting non-essentials.
_ 4. Themodeldepicts_ality for a particular purposeanda particular audience.
5. A model is an intellectual tool, a device that assists the thought process. Its value
• therefore is to be assessed primarily by the validity of the conclusions or decisions
to which it leads. *_
Our model is used as a mathematical tool to predict performance as it progresses from one stage
of the process to the next (as illustrated in figure 10) and to show what fina: utility is achieved at
a particular cost after a certain amount of testing is done.
TheT_rO ModelEquations
TableIIisprovidedasaguidetotheequationsthatfollowinthisection.
TableII
ListofDefinitions
.Sy_mbgl yaluegr _Def'_t_ns
Ac 0.0205
As,A 1,A 5 Variabi©coefficient
Bc 0.442
Bs 0.757
B1 0.396
C C_nemlcoefficient z
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Table II (Con't)
Value or Definitions
Fc(tf) Cumulative failures, compone_nt test
Fs(tf) Cumulativefailures,systemtest
=4.
am,
_ F)(tf) Cumulativefailures,inorbit
fc(tf) d(F0(tf))/dt
ft(tf) d(Fs(t f))/dt
9 t
-_'. f'l (tf) d(F l (tf))/dt
)tit
N Number ofcomponents
• K5 O.00$testing)12(averagefailur_atefort"trst12hofcomponent _I
K6 N X lO"7
"" K7 N X7.$XlO "6
t time in test or in orbit
: Subscriptsc,s,I,2,3 RefertocomponentorsystemleveltestsorPtrst,scooted,
orthirdRights,respectively
II
Subscriptf Final value
- Subscripti Interconnect
• Subscripto Othercauses
., Subscriptt-v Thermal-vacuumcauses
Subscript(x.x) DcchionsD2 andD3 apply;D2 onlyifot..yonevalue
isnoted
Superscriptbar,(asin_ Averagevalue
Based on 1$0 component level tests (taken from the data used in NASA TM 80297 plus MMS
data loss that for the EU's and RIU's) w;th stttaverage test duration of 187h, one can, using a 24b
time increment with the Kaplan and Meier method, form an eqt, ation to describe the cumulative
numberoffailuresduringcomponenttatas
Fc(t) = N A_ tsc (201 -• !
!
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On a per component basis, tim can be differentiated to give a cumulative failure rate of
fc(t) = Ac Be t(Be'I) . (21)
failures per component per hour.
At the end of 187h, the failure rate _s then
fc(187) = 0.000489 . (22)
•Based on 39 system level tests which had an average duration of 17.3 days (415.2h) and an average
complement of 65 components, we can - using a 24h step as before - define the cumulative
number of failures during systems test as
Ft(t) = N X 0.000904 tBs (23)
and the cumulative failure rate per component as
fs(t) = 0.000904 Bs t(B*-I) (24)
If we assume a constant failure rate over the first 12h of a test and that the failure rate at the end
of a test program is relatively constant over a 12h period, we can define the average cumulative
failure rate at the beginning of the system test as
- 1 /2 t(ss.t )
=w a 0.000904 Bs dt (25)fs(12) 12 o
or
fs(l 2) " 0.000494. (26)
One would expect a difference in _iifiiuiative failure rates to exist when comparing that at the end
of the component test program with that at the beginning of the system test program. This should
be true at least from the fact that the system test program incorporates the interconnection of the
components - so that they must act in concert - as well as the interconnecting hardware plus,
generally, some other previously untested equipment. As an approximation, we introduce the term
_ii(12) to account for this interconnection failure rate during the first I7h of test and def'me it as
- 0.000494 - 0.000487
fi(12) _*0.000007 . (27)
24
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Wetake fi (I 2) as an additive term in the system test program so that no amount of testing at the
component level can correct the flaws it represents. Furthermore, hypothesizing that fi (1°-)
results basically from the intergration of the components, we approximate its form as a function
of the number of components and designate a term K6 such that
_(12)= N X 0.000007/65= N X I0"7=.K6 . (28)
' Ifwe attributehesameexponento fiasin(24),andassume(pendingmorecompletedata
analysis)thatitequals(Bs-I),thenwe may write
_(12)= AiBst(Bs'1dt
or
-.r:,2>.(,2>("B,); oo) ,,!
Then, taking As as was clone with AI, we malt write
,t
,!
fs(ts)--AiBs(ts)(Bs"I)+ As Bs(ts_(Bs'l). (31) i
if i
I f'2 Bs(ts)(er') t= As dt , (32)fc(tcf) "_ o ]
i
q(tef) = 1._ AS(12)Bs- As(121Bs'I) (33)
AS = fc(tcf)(12)(l'Bs ) , (34)
then,from(30),(3I)and(34),
fi(t,) = [K6(I 2)(! -Bs) -I-fc(tcf)(l 2)(l'Bs)] Bs(ts)(B''l) (35)
fs(ts) ,, [g 6  fc(tcf)]X (12)(14s) Bs(t)(gs'l) (36)
and
Fs(ts) = [K6 fc(tct.)] X (12) (l'Bs) tBs (37)
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Within the 39 spacecraft that were used to develop (23), were 31 that were included in the PRC
data base. From this data base, and again using a 24h time increment for curve fitting, we can
describe the orbital pel'formance as
F1(t) =N X 0.00288t Bl (38)
and
_."
fl(t) = 0.00288 BI t(BI'I) (39)
The averagefailureateforthef'urst12his
B
_.i,_ fl(12)= fl(t)dt (40)
= 0.000642. (41)
Sincefs(415.2)= 0.000158,thereisa significantdifferenceb tweenthefailureatesattheendof ';i
thesystem-levelt stprogramandthebeginningoftheorbitalcase.Again,thisisnotunexpected
sincetheorbitalcaseincludesfailuresduetocausesotherthantheseonemay associatewiththe
• thermal.vacuumtest,e.g.failuresduetovibroacoustics.Letusdesignatehese"othercause"
failureatesas .'o(t).Ifwe assume,pendingmorecompletedataanalysis,thatthefailureates
may betransmittedfromthesystemtestleveltotheorbitalcase,thenbasedonthecurrentdata
we may writeasin(27)
f'o(12)=_I(12)-fs(41S.2). (42)
Substitutingfrom(41),we have
f'o(12) = 0.000642 - 0.000158 "_0.000484 (43)
_' Ifwe assumefo tobea functionofspacecraftcomplexityasmeasuredbythenumberof
components,we canestablishacoefficientK7 suchthat
K7 = N X 0.000484/65= N X 7.5X I0"6. (44_
Also,ifwe a._,sumethatthefo andf3 termsarisefromsimilarequationshavingthesame
exponent,B3,we may proceedasin(29),
In orbital case, we may write
_.o(12) _2 _ 2 Ao BI l) Ao(12)BI- t(BI" dt" 7_
_o(12) = Ao(12) (I _Bt) (45)
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Substituting the value for K7 as in (44), we write
Ao = f'o(12) X (12) (I'B1) = K7(12) (l'Bl) . (46)
Then, as in (12),
fl(t ) = (A ° + AI ) B1 tl(Bl "1) (47)
from which, as was shown in developing (34),
A1 = fs(tsf) (12) (1"Be) (48)
and
Fl(tl)= (A ° < ¨ )tl B1 (49)
and
fl(tl)=(A ° +A1 ) B1 tl (Bl'l). (50)
Turning for a moment to the question of average utility, U, we can see that the form of (49) precludes
the attainment of U below some given level, namely that due to the Ao term which is unaffected
by the thermal-vacuum test program. If the A1 term were zero (i.e., no failures occurred due to
causes that could be uncovered by thermal-vacuum testing), then the best averageavailability that
could be achieved would still be no greater than
U=tl [1 -0.273 exp (-0.0086N)] [K7(12)(l'B 1)el(Blade (51)
Using the approaches developed previously, we can describe performance in orbit for three other
cases:
1. component test but no system test,
2. system test but no component test, and
3. no test.
Since there is no actual data for these cases, additional assumptions will be needed.
1. Component Test,but .noSyste m Test
The number of failures during the component test program and the failure rates t:an be expRssed
as in (20) and (21) as
27
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Fc(t) = N Ac t11c (52)
and
fc(t) " rkc Bc t(Be'I). (53)
If there weee a system level test, the average failure rate during the first 12h, would be, from (37),
1_ _o12 "Bs) t(B,'l)_s(12) = [K6 + fc (tef)] (12)(1 Bs dt
- [K6+f, (tcf)](12) (I'Bs) (12)(Bs "1) .
_s(l2)" K 6+ f¢(tcf) (54)
Sothe- _flu-re-s-wodd-be-generated , but-we choose to neglect-thetn-because they are unassignable. "t
If now we propogate _2 (l 2) forward to the orbital case as though it were fs(tsf) in (48), (49),
and (50), we may def'me the orbital case characteristics as
BI
F l(t I) =N (Ao +A I) t l
Fl(t 1) = N [K 7 (12) (I'BI) + fs (tsf) (12)(l'lal)] tBl . ($5)
Since we define the final system level test failure as the same as the averageof the f'ast 12h were
there a test, then
fs(tsf) = _s (12) (56)
and, from (54), (55) may be rewritten as
FI(tl)=N IK7(12)(I'BI)+(K 6 + fe(tef)) (12)(l'B1)I riB1
" FI (tl,) = N [f¢(tcf) + K6 + K7] (12) (1"111)tl !11 (57) _
Note that F 1(t I ) cannot be less than
F! (t I ) " NtK6*K71(t2)(l-B!) t_ai . ($s)
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Also, given U and tl, tcf may be defined as
tcf - (((F l (t t )/(N( 12)(l -e t ) t I Bt)) _ Ke .. K7)/(A c B:))( l/(e c"l )) (59)
sothatan.ycomponenttestdurationequaltoorlargerthantcfwillprovideatleastheminimum,
desbedU. Itispossiblethat henecessarytcf_ 0 _nwhichcasenotestswillbenecessary.It
isalsopossiblethatno solutionexistsinwhichcaseU waschosenbelowthepossibleminimum.
2. SystemTestbutno ComponentTest
__J
We taketheaveragefailureateofcomponents,hadtherebeencomponentleveltests,astheaverage
failureateforthebeginningofthesystemleveltest,bothoverthefLrst12hintewal.
i._ f 2 t(Bc"t)_c(12)= Ac B¢ dt= K5 (60)O
Substituting(36),
2
fs(ts)= [K6(12)(I'Bs ) + KS(12) (!'Bs)] Bs ts(Be'I)
fs(ts) ; (K s + K6)(12) (l'Bs) Bs ts(Bs'l) (61)
and
Fs(ts)= N(Ks + K6)(12)(I"Bs)tBs. (62)
As in(46),A l= fs(tsf)(I2)(I"BI)and,substitutingfrom(42),
A! " (Ks 6)(12)(l'ss)Bsts(Bs'l)(12)(I'BI)
A 1 "(K5 + K6)(12)(2"Bs'sl)Bsts(Bs'l) (63)
andfrom(47),
Fl(tI)= [K7(12)(I'81)+ (Ks+ K6)(12)(2"Bs'81)Bsts(Bs'l)ItlBI (64)
Forapre-def'medU and tI,we cansolveforts as
ts= (((FI(tl)/tlBl)--K7 (12)(I'BI))/((K5• K6)(12)(2"Bs'BI)Bs)(I/(Bs'1)) (65)
29
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3. No Test
In this case we assume that the initial component failure rate characteristics propagate to the system
test, and the initial system test failure characteristics propagate to the orbital case. As in (60), we
define the initial component level failure characteristics as
_'c(12) = Ks . (66)
The system level failure characteristics are then described as the average of the first 12h of hypo-
thetical system test or, from (6 I),
_s(12) = 1_ (Ks + K6) (12)(l'Bs) (12)Bs
_(12) ffiK5 +K 6 . (67)
Since the failures that these failure rates infer do not take place daring tests, they are not con-
sidered.
Since fs (12) is the same as fs(ts) in (48), we may write '.f
A1 = (K5 + K6) (12) (1"B1) (68)
i
and, substituting into (49), !
!
FI(tl)=N[K 7 (12) (I-B1) + (K s +K 6) (12) (I'B1)] tlB1 ]J
Fl(tl) = N[K s + K6 + KT] (12)(l'Bl)tl B1 (69) 1
t
If one has a mission of duration tl and a predefine_d U, then, if the number of failures found by
(69) is less than those that produce the necessary U, no test is needed.
Failure Flow Process and Utility for Multiple Flights
In order to demonstrate the approach and not to become too cumbersome, we limit ourselves to '
no more than three flights (although the process allows for more). Table III indicates the various
options that can be exercised
3O
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Table III
Available Options
Test Decisions Flight Decisions i
Component System
Level, C Level, S First, D1 Second, D2 Third, D3 I
0¢ 0s - 0 0
Io Is I I I
2 2
3 3 .!
4 4
where, under C and S: il
0c indicates no component level testing,
0s indicates no system level testing, ,_
10 indicates component level testing,
• Is indicates system level testing, i
so that (0¢, 0s) would indicate that neither component nor system level tests were done and (1¢,
0s) would indicate that component level tests were done but that there was no system level thermal-
vacuum test.
Similarly, ander decision D1, D2, and D3 :
0 indicates no reflight, regardlessof the results of the prev;.ousflight
1 indicates reflight if the mission is not accomplished (2, 3, and 4 follow from this)
2 indicates refUghtwithout repair, refurbishment, or retest
3 indicates reflight with repair and refurbishment but no retest
4 indicates reflight with repair, refurbishment, and thermabvacuum retest.
Since there is no program without at least one flight, the decision for Dt indicated by 0 does not
exist.
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We cannow considerthedecisionmatrix(C,5,DI,D2,D3);eachone(withtheexceptionofD I)
hasanumberofoptions.
The possibilityofmultipleflightsrequiresare-thinkingoftheconceptofutility.Imagine,for
instance,thatonechosesthepath(I,I,I,2,0).Thisguaranteesthat heoverallaverageutility
willbelessthanthepath(I,I,l,0,0)whichinvolvesone flightratherthantwo.However,we can
befairlycertainthatwe willgathermoredataduringtwoflightshanduringone(giventhatthe
firstflightofthetwoisaslongastheoneflightinthesingleflightcase).Yet,sincewithoutrepair,
refurbishment,andretestwe canexpect heinstantaneousutilityocontinuedecreasingyieldinga
low, overall average, we do gather additional data.
The difficulty lies in the definhion of overall, averageutility, i.e., the ratio or"the performance or"
the actual payload to that of = perfect one. The problem is described graphically in figure 1I.
I I
I 02"4 I
02" _ i
I
o2"2 I i
o,,
I
! =!
AverageUtility Umax1 Umu 2
Figure I 1
Effect of D2 Decisions on Cost and Average Utility
If we perform a test program and conduct a flight, we will arrive at some overall average Uti_ty for
a particular cost atpointD l. I/now we simply refly, we have incurred an added cost due to
reflight but may expect the performance to continue degrading resulting in a decrease in this
utility.ThisconditioncorrespondstothepointD 2= 2.
Ifwe repairandrefurbish,we canexpecta furthercostincreasebutwillprobablyincreasethe
averageutilityb bringingthepayloadperformancenearertotheideal.This conditionisshown
asthepointD2 = 3 onfigureII.ItwillbehigherandalmostcertainlytotherightofpointD2 = 2.
ItwillikelybetotherightofthepointD 1 butwe cannotbesure.Finally,ifwe includetesting,
asimilarthoughtprocesswillbring ustothepointD2 - 4,a_inprobablytotherightofthe
pointD 1.
(NotethatUmJx! isthemaximum averageutilityhatcanbeobtainedinoneflight.Itisinde-
pendentofthethermal.vacuumtestprogram.Umax2 howevermay bedependenton theper-
formanceduringthef'_tflightandthesuccessoftherepairprograms;forins;ante,thef_t flight
±
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may uncover additional non-thermal-vacuum related failures as the duration is extended, and the
repairsbeforethesecondfl/shtwouldcorrecttheseflawsthatwouldotherwisehavedegradedthe
performanceofthesecondflight.)
Ifwe now constructagraphasinf/gure12,we candescribetheprocessintermsofamissionwhere
o_rgoal/stogatheraspecificamountofdata.
I
I D2 - 4
,/II
°,y,
./ I
I
DataGathered A
Figure12
EffectofD2 DecisionsonCostandDataGathered
Here,asbefore,byconductinga particulartestprogram,we arriveatpointD! havingathered
someportionofthedesiredquantityofdata,A. Ifwe now simplyrefly(withoutanyrepa_ or
retest),we willincurtheaddedcostofreflightbutwillprobablyincreasethequantityofdatathat
wasgathered.PointD2 = 2 wouldthenbeaboveandtotherightofpointDI. Decisions3 and4
wouldleadtopointsD2 - 3 and D2 = 4,increasinglytotherightandaboveD I. We cannot
intuitivelydeterminewhetherwe willcrosstheLineatA,butwe wouldatleastmovetowardit.
Ascanbeseeninfigu_-eII,itispossibletoprogresstotheleftasa fi/ghtprogramiscontinued.
Figures!1and 12canbethoughtofasdepictingprocessesimportantotwodifferentkindsof
missions.FigureIIcouldbeappliedtoamissionwherealevelofperformanceisrequiredas
mightbethecasewithacommunicationsrelaysatellite.Figure12couldrepresentascientific
miss/onsuchasdefiningtheultravioletspectralsignaturesofacertaingroupofstars.Ineither
caseit/simportantoknow theinstantaneouscapabilityofthepayload(asmightbedefinedby
thenumberoffailuresthatoccur).Therefore,ouruseoffailureinformationshouldbedonein
l_htofthemissiontowhichitapplies.Forthepurposeofthispaper,we willimitourselvesto
thosecaseswhereaverageutilityistheapplicablecriterion.Further,itisappliedona per.flight
basis.
Sincetheaverageutilityforthefkst_t (d_.signatedasU!)_sestablishedbythedecisionsat
thetestlevels,itmay bede£medasaminimum costapproach,i.e.,aspecifiedU l _r minimum
cost.We thenproceedwiththedecisionsD2 andD3 withtheassumptionthatU I doesnot
fulf'dlthem/ssionrequirements.
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From preliminary data analysis, it appears that tbr cases involving costly payloads, the minimum
cost programs involve thermal-vacuum testing at both the component and system levels; we then
discuss this case first. Furthermore, it is assumed that flights may be viewed or act upon a payload
as an additional teLLWetherefor¢ car, proceed with .'.e concept of a failure flow process, e.g., it"an
incipient failure doesn't occur during this flight, it may during a test following the flight or during
a succeeding flight.
Flowing from flight 1 to flight 2 without any repair, we have
I 12
fl(tlf)='_" fo A2 B2 t2(B2"l) de2 (70)
fl(tlf) = I'_ A2 (12)B2 = A2 (12)(B2"1) (71)
A2 = ft(tlf) (12)(l'B2) (72)
where B2 = BI and tlf is the final flight time of the first flight for the minimal cost-utility
strategy using component and systems level testing.
U2(2) means the average utility for flight 2, under decision 2, and U2(3) means the average '_t
4
utility for flight 2, under decision 3.
Note that these are not utilities that include the previot,s flight.
As before,
fz(t2)" eft(tl f) + K8 ] (12)(1 "B2) B2 t2(B2"I) • (73)
Since we currently have no data to speculate on the constant K8, where K8 is a constant similar
to K7 but between the first and second flights, we assume that it exists for similar reasons as
before and assume Ks = K7 . This assumption means that we are including a flight interconnect
type term in our model. It also means that the Lift-off has an effect on failures that cannot be
accounted for. From (67) we have
F2(2)(tg ) = [fi(tlf) 8 ] (12) (I'B2) t2 B2 (74)
and
= n (1 - D*)(F2(2) (t2)) dt2 . (75)
U2(2) t2 f f
This argument generalizes if we consider the various combLngtionsof test options because fi (el f)
can be calculated under these options as explained in the previous sections,
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FLIGHT 2,OPTION 3
B2 " B! andtheassumptionismade thatafterthefirstflight,we canrepa_thosefailuresthat
haveoccurredinflight,boththosewhichaxedetectableinthethermal-vacuumtestenvironment
andthosewhicharenot.Thuswe haveK8/2 insteadof Ks.
The utilityLsbasedon
KS -B2) (B2-I)
f2(3)(t2)=[fl(tlf)+_-_-](12)(I B2 t2 (76)
and
F2(3)(t2)= [f1(tlf)+K_ ](12)(i.82)t2B2 ; (77)
hence,
- l /t2f(l"D*)(F2(3)(t2)) dt2. (78) iU2(3)= t2""_o _
FLIGHT 2, OPTION 4
Hereagainthe_tflityhasstartedoverat1.0tobegintheflightbutwiththeadditionalcostof
repay,refutbi:,Itment,and estingandachangeinthefailuremode. To accountforthechange
inthefailuremode,we usethemechanismasdescribedbefore;thuswe have
(s2s-l)
fl(tlf)_"l-_ _o12 A2sB2s t2s dt2s (79)
!
= I"2'_A2s(12)B2s= A2s (12)(B2s'l) (80)
Or
A2s= fl(tlf)(12) (l'B2s) (81)
where B2s - B2.
Asbefore,
!
f2s(4)(t2s)= [fl(tlf)](12)(1"B2s)B2st2s(B2s'l) (82)
35
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and
F2s(4)(t2t) = [fl(tlf)l (12)(l-B_" t2s)B2s'l ) (83)
Wehavenot assumeda componentteststagesinceit appearsmost likely that only the few com-
ponentsthat haveexhibited a failurewouldbe retested,and this is m_:chlike the processin a
system leveltest program. After the test stage,thesefailuresflow into the secondflight, andwe
have
1 fl2 t (82.1)= A2 B2 dt2 (84)f2t(4)(t2sf) _" o
1 ; (85)
_,(4)(t2sf ) at_ A2 (12)B2 = A2 (12)(B2 "I)
therefore,
A2 = f2s(a)(t2sf) (12) (1"82) (86)
where B2 = B1 , _t
As before,
- _ . - B2 t2 (87)fz(4)(t2) [f2s(4)(t2sf) + ] (19) (t'B'_) (B2-'I)
and
F2(4)(t 2) = [f2s(¢)(t2sf) + _ l (12) (1"B2) t2B2 • (88)
Therefore,we have
: 1 ft2f (l..D.)(F2s(4)(t2))at--. j dt2 , (89)
• 0:(4) t2f o
This discussion takes care of the calculation for flight 2 after the decision D2, is made. Wenow
turn to the caleulatiom based on the decision D_ and options (2, 3,4) before third flight.
FLIGHT 3, OPTION 2
z
Flowing from flight 2 into flight 3 with D3 a 2, we must base our analysis on each of the tM'ee :
failure rates, f2(2)(t2), f2(3)(t2 ), and f2(4)(t2), from the previous decision.making process. --
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Using the final failure rate f2(2) (t2f), we have
.. - f3(2,2)(t3 ) m [f2(2)(t2f ) + K_I (12)(1"B3) B3 t3(B3"l) 190)
.:.
: and
F3(2,2)(t31 = [f2(2)(t2f) + K8 ] (121 (1 "B3) t3 b3 (91)
i-
• where we attume B3 = B2 = BI until we have data to adjust these estimates. Thus,
- . a_ f tl f+t2f+t3f (1.D*)(F3(2,2)(t3)) dt 3 . (92)
_, U3(2,2) t3f tlf+t2f
E
If option 2 for the third flight follows from option 3 for the second flight, we use f2(3)(t2f), and
• we have
- f3(3,2)(t3 ) = [f2(3)(t2f ) + 5 ] (12) (1 "B3) B3 t3 (B3"I) (93)" 2
and
Ke 2)(I-B3) B 3
F_(3,2)(t3) = [f2(3)(t2f) -t-._- ] (1 t3 (94)
Then,
U3(3,2) = I_ f t2f | XL(1.D,)(_3(3,2)(t3))dt3(9$1
t3f t2f
If we now consider the case where option 2 for the third flight follows from option 4 for the
.. second flight, we use f2(4)(t2), and we have
Ks )
. f3(4,a)(t3) = [f2(4)(t2f) + _ ] (12) (1"83) B3 t3 (B3"i (96)
and
K8 -B3)
FB(4,2)(t3)- [f2(4)(t2f) + _ ] (12) (I t3B3 . (97)
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We have for utility
- 1 --f t2f+t3f
( I_D.)(F 3(4,2)O3 )) dt 3' (98) i
U3(4,2) = t'_f Jt2f ]
FLIGHT 3, OPTION 3 i
Following from flight 2 into flight 3 with option 3, we must base our analysis or calculation of
utility on each of the three failures rates, f2(2)(t2), f2(3)(t._ ), and f2(4)(to ), from the previous
decision making process. These derivations will be similar t'0 the pre,)i6us'0nes, but with an
adjustment for repair in the utility calculations.
We have, similar to the previousequations,
f3(2,3)(t3) = [f2(2)(t2f) + ] (12) (l'B3) B3 t3(B3-1) (99) _
all d
J
K8 l -B 3) B :¢[
F3(2,3)Ct3 )= [f2(2)(t2f )+ _ ] (12) ( t3 3 (100)
where K8 has been adjusted by a multiple of 1/2 due to one repair in the failure flow process.
K8 is adjusted by a multiple of (1/2) n (where n is defined as the total number of repairs in the
process). We use this method to account for learning. We have for utility,
1 /3f (I_D,)(F3(2,3)(t3)) dt3 (101) tU3(2,3) = "-"
t3f o
If option 3 for the third flight follows from option 3 for the second flight, we use f2(3)(t2f) and
have
f3 (3,3)(t ). = [f2(3)(t2f ) + h22 ] (12)(1"e3) B 3 t3 (B3"I) (102)
and
F3(3,3)(t3 ) = [f2(3)(t2f)+ .K_ ] (12)(I'B3) t3B3 (103)
- with
U3(3,3) mt3fl--" /t3fo (I-D*)(F3(3'3)(t3)) dt3 ' (104)
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1
If option 3 for the third flight follows the failure flow process from option 4 for the second flight,
then we use f2(4)(t2f); then,
f3(4,3)(t3) = [f2(4)(t2f) + _ ] (12) (I "B3) B 3 t2,(B3-I) (105)
and
K8 2)(1-_3)F3(4,3) (t3) = [f2(2)tt2f) * T ] (I t3 3 (106)
with
03(4,3) = l_= f t3f(l_D,)(F3(4,3)(t3)) dt 3 (107)t3f o
FLIGHT 3, OPTION 4
Under this decision, we must take each of the final failure rates, f2(').) (t2f), f2_3 (t2f), andf2(4)(t2f), and process them through a re-test stage and then t_ougli the thir ht stage.
Starting with f2(2)(t2f), we have
! / 12
12 Jo A3s B3s t3s(B3s'l) dt3s (108)f4(2)(t2f)
where B3s = B2.
If we make derivations similar to equations (79) thru (83), we have
f3s(2,¢)(t3s) = [f2(2)(t2f)] (12) (l'B3s) B3, t3s (B3s'l) (109)
and
F3s(2,4)(t3s) = [f2(2)(t2f)] (12) (l'a3s) t3sB3s . (110)
Extending f3s(2,4)(t3s) into the third flight, and using a derivation similar to equations (78) thru(81),we have
f3(2,4)(t3) = [f3s(2,4)(t3sf)+ _ ] (12) (l'e3) B3 t3 (B3-I) (111)
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and
F3(2,4)(t3) - [f3s(2,4)(t35f) + _ ] (12) (l°B3) t3 B3 (112)
with
U3(2,4) =-'lt3f fo t3f (l.D,)(ff3(2,4)(t3)) dt3 . (113)
Weextend f2()3 (t2 f) and f2(4)(t2f) into the system level test and obtain f3s(,)34 (t3s) and
f3s()4,4 (t3s) as in equation (| 13). From these equatiom we obtain f3( )3,4 (t3) and
f3(4,4)(t3) as in equation (111) and F3(3A)(t 3) and F3(4,4)(t 3) as m equation (112).
These failure functions yield
l f t3f-- -- (l-D*) (F3(3'4)(t3)) dt._ (114)U3(3,4) t3 f o
and
t f t3f (l-D*) (F3(4,4)(t3)) dt 3 , (115)
 3¢4,4)= o
As a f'malcomment on utility, we mention that their confidence intervals axe calculated as in the
previous section where time allowances are made for the various repair, refurbish, no repair, etc.
options.
For example, if there is no repair and two flights are made, where t I is the time in the first flight
and t2 is the time for the second flight, then we have the total time interval from (o, t 1+12).
To calculate the variability for averageutility after two flights, we calculate failures using the
assumption of process dependence at the end of the time (t I+t2).
If repair is made after the first flight, then we calculate the failure made at t2.
Another scheme to place bounds on averageutility can be devised by using the Product Limit
procedure and regression to calculate upper and lower bounds on the failure mode functions F(t).
To _ttate this relationship, we construct the curve F(t) and its upper and lower confidence
bounds versus averageutility achieved (see figure 13). Note that as the cumulative number of
failures increases, the averageutility, U, decreases.
Suppose one obtains U = 0.8 in flight 1. To f'md Pr(U > Ua) = 0.95, Ua < 0,8, we calculate 90%
Product Limit confidence bounds, FU(t), FL(t) by regression using a real data base. We then
_roject up to Fu(t) from 0.8, over to F(t), and then down to U at 0 a where Pt_O_, Ut) =
0.95.
4O
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/ _' _ _ F(_)
0.9 0.8 0.7 - 0.6
AverageUtility Ue
Figure 13
Bounds for _,vera_-Utility
This argument can be reversed to yield a test program which gives the desired utility based on a
minimal cost thermal-vacuum program. What one does is to reverse the path, find the utility one
needs to obtain, and then refers to the minimal cost curve for thermal-vacuum test program to
determine the particular test program.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES
1. Study the question of complexity to see how it affects the calculation of utility.
2. Use the science of Information Theory to better quantify ideas about obtaining and using
information from Space Shuttle experiments. Build guides for management to use in planning
missions in terms of the actual information needed to complete an experiment.
3. Apply utitity to individual components in an experiment havingseveral components to deter-
mine the model of overail utitity for the total number of components.
4. Study the process dependent assumption; obtain data to either verify or change this
assumption.
$. Gain data from Space Shuttle missions to model and establish the relationships of fai|ure
between individ_l flights and to measure the interconnect effects in flight as well asfor te_t.
6. Trace failure flow data through component and system levels thermal-vacuum tests and on
into flight.
41
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7. The timing of testing; is testing prior to flight 1 equivat:at to testing between flights? Does
the timing matter?
8. Is there a relationship between complexity and refurbishment costs? An examination of the
LANDSAT data might reveal one.
9. Is there an ultimate Ureax less than 1.07 Our model and the intuition it is based upon
suggests that there is. If so, what is that level and why?
10. The cost figures appear io be changing rapidly. An updated version of The STS Reimburse-
ment Guide is necessar/to calculate accurate costs. Too, since updating is Likely, they should
be easy to change in the computer program.
1I. A more _areful look at scientific decision making is needed. We.have shifted the model's
output toward information that 're believe is more attuned to managers' needs. The question
now is whether they will. ._
I
j_
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